social factors (e.g. Deloitte, 2009; Klare, 2004; Stern, 2006) . They stated further that there was a significant risk for this to occur before 2020. The authors found that, given current production decline rates of existing oil fields (4% annually), the world would have to discover the equivalent oil resources of one new Saudi Arabia every three years (9 million barrels of daily production capacity), in order to keep up with current demand.
Unconventional oil was not taken into account in the report; it argued that production from such sources (e.g. Canadian Tar Sands) is unlikely to expand enough to fill the gap, given that they hold different properties, as mentioned above. Moreover, their extraction is environmentally and socially problematic (Davidson and Andrews, 2013; Kean, 2009 ). Similar problems and limitations are emerging regarding the recent hype (e.g. Chazan, 2012; Kenny, 2012; Maugeri, 2012) about shale oil and gas. It has motivated the IEA to herald the start of a 'golden age of gas ' (IEA, 2012b) and to predict that the US would overtake Saudi Arabia as an oil producer within a decade (IEA, 2012c) . Many scientists and analysts are critical with regards to these projections (Bullis, 2012; Hamilton, 2012; Healy, 2012; Reuters, 2012; Sorrell, 2012; Strahan, 2007) . Shale wells are very expensive; reach their maximum production levels (peaks) much earlier than conventional ones and are therefore difficult to operate profitably (Kerr, 2012) . Moreover, there are also reports highlighting the environmental problems of shale oil and gas (Ellsworth, 2013; Healy, 2012; Howarth et al., 2012; Jackson et al., 2013; van der Elst et al., 2013) . Fig. 1 below from the International Energy Agency (IEA) seems to confirm the UKERC results mentioned above. However, the organization assumes that the decline of conventional resources will be more than compensated by 'yet to be developed' and 'yet to be found' oil fields and unconventional sources. Similar numbers are published by other intergovernmental and governmental organizations such as the USGS (United States Geologic Survey), EIA (Energy Information Agency). Nevertheless, it is argued that the IEA projections are overly optimistic (Aleklett et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2005; Jakobsson et al., 2009) .
Given that there is substantial evidence that Peak Oil is imminent, the paucity of research looking at the potential economic impacts of this phenomenon is surprising (exceptions include Arto-Oliazola and Kerschner, 2012b; Kerschner and Hubacek, 2009; Logar and van den Bergh, 2013; Lutz et al., 2012) . In general, economists have shown little interest in investigating the effects of oil price shocks (for a review of the existing literature see Hamilton, 2005; Kilian, 2008) . This may be due to the fact that according to mainstream economic theory, impacts of such oil-price shocks can only be rather minimal and temporal, because it is argued that oil (as any resource) is only scarce in a relative sense (e.g. Adelman and Lynch, 1997; Barnett and Morse, 1963; Hisschemoller et al., 2006; Jackson, 2006; Lenssen and Flavin, 1996; Lynch, 1999; Maack and Skulason, 2006; Odell, 1999; Solow, 1974) , not absolutely (Daly, 1992) . This means that the price mechanism in a 'free' market is supposed to raise the price of the resource, making it attractive to explore substitutes or to develop technologies for using it more efficiently i.e. the socalled 'Hotelling's rule of substitutability' (Hotelling, 1931) or Nordhaus and colleague's notion of the 'backstop technology' (Nordhaus et al., 1973) .
However, historical studies (e.g. Hamilton, 2011b) of oil shocks and price fluctuations (such as those experienced in 1973, 1979, 1990, and 2008) suggest that oil shortages pose a high risk for economies. Indeed, some experts argue that high oil prices may have been a partial cause for the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 (Hamilton, 2009; Kaufmann et al., 2010; Stern, 2010) and the current recession in OECD countries (Hagens, 2008; Li, 2012; Skrebowski, 2011; Stern, 2010; Tverberg, 2010) . The 'HirschReport' commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy in 2005, concluded that Peak Oil would cause an energy crisis never seen before, resulting in high oil prices and prolonged economic hardship. In addition, adequate adaptation measures would have to be implemented at least a decade in advance (Hirsch et al., 2005) . Such warnings are echoed in many other official statements: U.S. Pentagon (USJFC, 2010), German Bundesweer (ZTransfBw, 2010), IEA staff (Dicolo, 2011; MacAlister and Monbiot, 2008) . In fact the U.S. armed forces have been preparing for resource wars already some time ago (Clonan, 2008 ; U.S. Army, 2008) and powerful business groups in the UK were lobbying the government to develop a Peak Oil contingency plan (ITPOES, 2010) .
Hence, we conclude that Peak Oil poses an important risk to world economies due to its proximity and potential serious impacts. In this study we developed a measure for economic vulnerability to Peak Oil. Vulnerability refers to the weaknesses of a system, due to an overdependence on a particular resource, the system's structure, or a combination of the two. Vulnerability reduces a system's resilience (Turner et al., 2003) . By resilience, we refer to ''the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks'' (Walker et al., 2004, p. 1) . In this case, we consider in what ways an economic system can be vulnerable to Peak Oil. We do so by asking two questions: (1) Are certain economic sectors more vulnerable to Peak Oil than others? If so, (2) how important are these sectors to the overall economy? In answering these questions, we develop a vulnerability map of the economy that can potentially inform policy by showing which key sectors can be supported or sustained, and which ones might need restraining. Other policy approaches may favor the phasing out or substitution of sectors, which are both vulnerable to Peak Oil and important for the economic system.
In this paper, we analyze the vulnerability of the U.S. economy, which is the biggest consumer of oil and oil-based products in the world, and thus provides a good example of an economic system with high resource dependence. However, the notable advantage of our approach is that it does not depend on the Peak-Oil-vulnerability narrative but is equally useful in a climate change context, for designing policies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. In that case one could easily include other fossil fuels such as coal in the model and results could help policy makers to identify which sectors can be controlled and/or managed for a maximum, low-carbon effect, without destabilizing the economy.
Materials and methods
In our analysis, we first measure sector level vulnerability. For this purpose we use the expected increase of a sector's output prices after an assumed oil price hike, indicating the sector's C. Kerschner et al. / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx-xxxdirect and indirect dependence on oil, as a proxy of its vulnerability. The Leontief input-output price model (LPM) (see e.g. Miller and Blair, 2009 ) is employed to reveal these potential price increases. Next, we analyze which of these sectors are most important to the US economy. We measure relative importance via two approaches: one being forward linkage analyses (FLA), and input-output calculus (see e.g., Miller and Blair, 2009) , which considers the direct and indirect contribution of a sector to GDP and is thus a measure of relative ''monetary importance'' and the other being outdegree centrality from social network analysis (SNA), which provides an indication of the ''structural importance'' by looking at how integral a sector is to the overall economy, based on its structural position within a network rather than the size of monetary flows [see also Kagawa et al. (2008) for an oil price shock analysis combining SNA and IO]. There are other centrality measures that capture the notion of importance, namely eigenvector centrality and betweenness. We have found, in analyzing our data, that these different centrality measures are highly correlated, which others have noted as well (e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994) . Jones et al. (2004) already argued that the effects of oil price shocks were difficult to model, but best suited were sector specific economic models. Input-output (IO) analysis offers this quality and has already been identified by Kerschner (2006) and Kerschner and Hubacek (2009) as a useful approach for estimating potential economic effects of Peak-Oil. Kerschner (2006) also identified the LPM as a promising candidate for analyzing the price dimension of Peak-Oil and applied the model to the UK, Japan and China (Kerschner, 2012a) . Previously applications focused mainly on simulating the price impacts of environmental policies (Giarratani, 1974) , fuel (Catsambas, 1982) and other taxes (Cardenete and Sancho, 2002; Hughes, 1986; Melvin, 1979) , or more general changes in primary inputs and import prices (McKean and Taylor, 1991) .
The Leontief Price Model (LPM)
The LPM, also known as cost-push input-output price model (Dietzenbacher, 1997; Oosterhaven, 1996) , is the mathematical dual of the traditional demand-pull input-output quantity model (or Leontief Model) (Miller and Blair, 2009) . It is also subject to the usual limitations of input-output modeling: fixed input coefficients, constant returns to scale, and ignoring final demand change due to consumer behavior. This also implies that a price increase does not allow for substitution possibilities. However, oil, as a primary source of energy with an extraordinary high net energy content (Brown et al., 2009; Odum and Odum, 2001) or energy return on investment (EROI) (Hall and Klitgaard, 2011 ) is difficult to substitute in the quantities and qualities needed (Kerschner, 2012a) . Moreover, in this paper, we are interested in the short-term economic effects of Peak-Oil. In this case the LPM provides a reasonable estimation of prices, as in the short-run there is little time for adaptive substitution efforts. The model can be specified as follows:
where x j is the total input of sector j; z ij is the input of sector i to sector j; v l j is labor input in sector j; v k j is the capital input; v m j is the import. In matrix notion, we re-write Eq. (1) by:
Here, x 0 denotes a row vector of sectorial inputs; Z denotes a matrix of z ij ; v 0 is row vector of sum of labor cost (l), capital (k) and import (m); i 0 is a row vector of ones.
Substituting Z ¼ Ax and post-multiplying byx À1 , we can obtain:
where A denotes a matrix of technical coefficients representing the inputs required to produce one US$ worth of output for each sector.
v 0 c is a row vector of factor input coefficients that denotes the factors of production (capital, labor and imports) required to produce one US$ worth of domestic sectorial output. Hence, we can interpret them as base year index pricesp j , so that p 0 ¼p 1 ;p 2 ; . . . ;p n ½ . The Leontief price model (LPM) can therefore be defined as follows:
which leads to:
Frequently, the model is transposed and expressed in terms of column vectors rather than row vectors, theñ
Therefore, changes in v c would lead to both a direct and an indirect price increase in the whole economy due to the interdependency of economic sectors. The price change can be captured by:
See Miller and Blair (2009, pp. 43-44) for a detailed description of the LPM.
Simulating Peak Oil using the LPM
In this paper, we apply the Leontief price model to US economic data to simulate a Peak-Oil-induced 100% oil price increase. In which ways and how quickly oil markets will react, once Peak Oil has been reached is unclear of course. As mentioned above some have already claimed that we are passed or close to this point and official statistical numbers are said to be intentionally distorted, precisely in order not to scare markets (Badal, 2010; MacAlister, 2009) . Even though projections of future oil prices by official statistical bodies, such as the IEA (International Energy Agency) or the EIA (Energy Information Administration) are continuously revised upwards, their numbers seem still quite low. In 2011, the EIA for example predicted oil prices of 126.03US$ per barrel for 2035 (EIA, 2011) , while in 2012 this estimate was raised to 144.98 for the reference scenario (EIA, 2012a) (the IEA (2012c) provides similar numbers). Nevertheless many energy and petroleum analysts doubt the credibility of these projections, as they are based on overly optimistic future production scenarios (Aleklett et al., 2010; Bentley, 2002; Gail the Actuary, 2010 Hirsch et al., 2005; Jakobsson et al., 2009) . A recent report by Barclays for instance predicted oil prices of 180 US$ per barrel until the end of the decade (Pickrell, 2012) .
Historically, inflation adjusted world oil prices from the turn of the 19th century oscillated between 20 and 40US$ (in constant prices), except for the geopolitically motivated price explosions in the 1970s and 1980s (Yom Kippur War -OPEC embargo and Iranian Revolution) and a temporal spike in the early 1990s (BP, 2012) . However in 2004, and without any obvious geopolitical driver, world oil prices left this margin for good so far (see Fig. A .2 in the appendix). They rose dramatically until reaching an unprecedented global record level of 145.16 US$/barrel (WTI cushing spot) on the 14th of July 2008 (EIA, 2012b), then briefly collapsing toward 60 US$ during the 2008-2009 world economic recession, only to rise again and remain at about 100 US$ until today. Many say that this is already due to the inability of supply to keep up with demand (Hamilton, 2009 (Hamilton, , 2011a Kerr, 2011; Rapier, 2012) , an indicator that Peak-Oil may have been reached or is near. Even the IEA's chief economist argues that high oil prices are here to stay (Wagner et al., 2010) .
Given these historic price developments we consider a 100% price increase a reasonable scenario for a potential market reaction and well suited for simulating economic impacts of oil scarcity due to supply limitations provoked by Peak Oil. Since oil prices currently (Fall 2013) oscillate around the 100US$/barrel (WTI cushing spot) barrier, this would mean a crude oil price of approximately 200 US$/barrel and in fact corresponds to the EIA's (2012a) high oil price scenario. (Natural gas prices also double in this simulation, which is justified for the reasons we will explain below.) The model calculates direct and indirect price increases in all sectors due to a Peak-Oil induced price increase in the ''oil sectors''. We use exposure to sectorial price increases as a proxy for the vulnerability of the US economy at the sector level. If production prices/costs of an industry rise substantially, one can assume that, depending on the price elasticity of its products, demand will suffer, potentially leading to bankruptcies and the eventual decline of certain oil thirsty industries. A real world example of today may be the ongoing wave of bankruptcies of German container shipping companies -a point we will return to below.
For our Peak Oil simulation we followed a dual strategy: First we choose the sector ''oil and gas extraction'' for representing a 100% price increase of domestically produced and processed oil and gas. Note, that in the Peak-Oil literature Peak-Oil and Peak-Gas are generally mentioned in the same breath (e.g. Aleklett and Campbell, 2003) , because they are such close substitutes. This is confirmed by empirical studies, many of which suggest an increase in gas prices of about 0.8$ for every dollar price increase in petroleum (Panagiotidis and Rutledge, 2007; Villar and Joutz, 2006; Vü cel and Guo, 1994) . In order to obtain a 100% price increase of the ''oil and gas extraction'' sector's output we raised its production costs (factors of production) capital, labor and imports at equal shares by approximately a factor of five (495%). The rationale behind using all three payment sectors at equal shares is that it is beyond the scope of this analysis to investigate which factor of production will be affected in what proportion from the higher prices. It could be the resource owners via changes in royalties, the processing industry with changes in profits, or the workers with changes in wages. Alternatively, the higher prices could also simply be due to higher costs in extraction and processing, given the fact that oil today is situated in ever more difficult to access deposits in ever worse quality.
This can be deducted from the IEA's latest World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2012c) (see Fig. 1 ), which clearly shows a current peak or plateau of currently producing conventional oil wells plus their shortly expected decline. Given the 'best-first principle', which has been known in economic theory at least since Ricardo (1821), we can assume that those sources, which are supposed to compensate for that decline in liquid fuels i.e. oil from yet to be found/developed deposits, unconventional oil and NGLs, are more costly to produce. Unconventional oil includes heavy oils, like Canadian tar sands and shale oil, polar-and deep-water (>500 m) oil. NGL's are light hydrocarbons that exist in liquid form underground and are produced together with natural gas and recovered in separation facilities or processing plants e.g. propane and butane.
Secondly, we address direct oil and gas imports of all sectors by increasing the corresponding share of their total imports equally by 100%. Moreover, we take an 85% share of all sectors' direct imports of refined petroleum products, which corresponds to that sectors fraction of production costs, which is determined by crude oil (the rest are the costs of the refining process) and also raise them by 100%. We generated this number using data of the EIA, regarding the composition of retail gasoline prices (IEA, 2012a). Here we draw the boundary for our analysis in that we do not consider the inevitable (given world oil markets) price increases in all other imports. Hence our results could be regarded as conservative. Price increases in all other sectors of domestic production e.g. energy production, on the other hand, will be taken care of by the ripple effects accounted for by the model.
Forward Linkage Analysis (FLA)
Forward-Linkages analysis (FLA) is one approach commonly used to measure the importance of economic sectors and their economic 'connectedness'. The approach is considered 'supplydriven' in that it looks at all the direct and indirect sales from a sector to see how these contribute to the economy's total output. For example, declining output in sector j also means that smaller amounts of product j are available to be used as inputs in other sectors for their own production. This means that one unit of output less from sector j creates smaller revenues throughout the economy, as it cannot be processed by other sectors, decreasing their output, which in turn is not available for use by other sectors and so on. The term forward linkage is used to indicate this kind of interconnection of a particular sector with ''downstream'' sectors to which it sells its output. There two ways to calculate FLA. One is using the Leontief Inverse Matrix (demand driven); the other is using Ghosh Inverse Matrix (supply-driven). The difference between Leontief Invers Matrix and Ghosh Invers Matrix is that the former is driven by the changes in final demand, but the latter is driven by the changes in value added. In this study, we follow Miller and Blair (2009, p. 558 ) who argue that the Ghosh inverse matrix is more appropriate for the measurement of forward linkages.
To compute forward linkages, one transforms the interindustry matrix into a direct-output coefficients matrix (referred to as B), where each of the coefficients b ij in B are calculated as follows:
where z ij is the input of sector i to sector j; x i is the total output of sector i. Then, allowing for I to be the identity matrix, we can generate the inverse output matrix, the so called Ghosh inverse matrix, as follows: (Miller and Blair, 2009 ). In essence, this inverse matrix is conceptually similar to the idea of multiplying B by itself an indefinite number of times, thus resulting in all the direct and indirect flows being captured in one single matrix G. Calculating forward-linkages for sector i (FL i ) is straightforward after this initial matrix conversion: one simply takes the row sums of G, and each row sum thus reveals the total value of intermediate sales of sector i as a proportion of the value of i's total output. Forward-linkages are calculated as follows:
This calculation was done for all 429 sectors in our dataset. The results were then ranked from high to low. A full list of results is found in Supporting Data File Table S2 .
Outdegree centrality
Outdegree centrality is a technique from social network analysis (SNA), a methodological approach with roots in sociology (Prell, 2012) . Social network analysis is used to C. Kerschner et al. / Global Environmental Change xxx (2013) xxx-xxx analyze social relations such as friendship or acquaintanceship among a given set of actors (often referred to as nodes). Similar to input-output analysis, which organizes economic data as a square, sector-by-sector matrix, SNA organizes relations into a square, actor-by-actor matrix. Also similar to IOA, social network analysis makes use of matrix algebra for studying structural regularities, and consequently has developed, over time, a toolkit of concepts and measures for identifying (among other things) important actors according to their structural position in the network of relations.
For the current paper, we made use of outdegree centrality, which is essentially a count of the number of direct, outgoing ties an actor has with others. In the context of our current data set, outdegree centrality would reflect the number of sectors to whom a given sector i provides monetary inputs. For example, if the sector 'transportation' had a high outdegree, this would imply that transportation provides inputs to many other economic sectors. As such, it would be considered an important sector.
To compute outdegree centrality we first dichotomized the intersectoral flow matrix Z ij to create a binary one D ij where a 1 represented the presence of a tie from i to j and 0 the absence of a tie. However, determining the cut-off value for transforming the matrix to 1s and 0s is not straightforward: previous uses of SNA for inputoutput data typically use cut-off values that result in binary matrices consisting of 'important flows' (Hioki et al., 2009; Miller and Blair, 2009) . Here, the analyst focuses attention only on those intersectoral flows greater than a specified value, and ignores all others. For our paper, the cut-off value used was simply any value greater than 1. If we had chosen a cut-off value of anything greater than 0, then all sectors would have held ties with one another, which would have not enabled us to detect any structural differences between sectors. By choosing a cut-off value of 1, we were able to capture the majority of ties in the dataset, not just those with higher dollar amounts. By dichotomizing the dataset, we ignored monetary considerations found in each cell and instead treated all flows between sectors equally. In addition, we chose to ignore the diagonal in our input-output matrix, as we were not interested in observing whether or not sectors delivered to themselves (i.e. self-reflexive loops). Thus, on the dichotomized matrix, we computed outdegree centrality (C i ) for sector i as follows:
Computing outdegree centrality scores for all sectors resulted in a vector of scores ranging from 0 to 422 (see Supporting Data File  Table S3 for full listing). We then converted scores to percentiles to show in which percentile a given sector rested, based on their outdegree score. Fig. 2 synthesizes the findings of our three models. It shows the size of the bubbles reflecting price changes in the 356 sectors due to the initial price shock (Dp from the LPM), ''relative structural sector importance'' (C i from SNA) on the X axis and ''relative monetary sector importance'' (FL i from FLA) on the Y axis. For the sake of better visualization we exclude Oil and Gas Extraction ("20) and five other sectors ("32, 115, 116, 118 and 119) which are very closely linked to the direct processing of oil and gas e.g. Petroleum Refineries. They naturally show price changes much above most other sectors (see supporting information file for details). Very high levels of monetary sector importance can be observed for Iron ore Mining ("22), Logging ("16) or Alumina Refining ("172) for example. In terms of structure, the most important sectors are related to transport such as by Pipeline Fig. 2 . Sectors' importance and vulnerability to Peak Oil. The bubbles represent sectors, some of which carry sector numbers for illustrative purposes. The size of the bubbles visualizes the vulnerability of a particular sector to Peak Oil according to the expected price changes; the larger the size of the bubble, the more vulnerable the sector. We have color-coded primary sectors in red (agriculture, mining, etc.), manufacturing sectors in blue and service sectors in yellow and highlight significant accumulations of certain sector groups by large circles. Note: In Fig. A.2 in the appendix, we provide an alternative representation of our results. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) ("327) 
Results
or Air ("326) (See supporting information file for a full list of
results).
Apart from the before mentioned oil/gas extraction and related sectors we found highest sector-level vulnerabilities for Carbon Black ("124 with a 27% price increase), Petrochemicals ("120 with 22%), Fishing ("17 with 15%), Fertilizers ("130 with 12%), and Pipeline and Air transportation sectors (" 327 & 326 with up to 11% of price increases). Through the color-coding we can see how sector categories tend to be grouped together: primary sectors rather on top and bottom left, secondary in the center and tertiary at the bottom left and center far right.
We further divided the graph in 4 quadrants. The bottom left quadrant (Q1) identifies the least important sectors in terms of both monetary and structural contribution. Some of the sectors in Q1 show considerable price increases e.g. Sugar Production ("48 and "49) . Sugar production is part of a cluster, which could be summarized as ''food production and processing'', with sectors such as Flour Milling ("43), Cheese Production ("56), and Ice Cream and Frozen Dessert Manufacturing ("58). However, the relatively small monetary and structural importance of these sectors suggests that ''Peak-Oil policy action'' may be less urgent here, except for facilitating their role as substitutes to sectors in Quadrant 3 (Q3), as we will elaborate below.
The upper left quadrant (Q2) holds sectors with increasing 'monetary importance'. We note the presence of a large number of primary sectors in this quadrant, in particular agricultural ones (e.g. sugar cane or oil seed farming and cattle ranching). It is not surprising that some primary sectors are structurally less important as their products tend to enter mostly into the respective processing industries e.g. Iron Ore Mining ("22) as inputs in Iron Mills ("170). In such cases, a sector has less direct influence on the overall economy, as it does not directly give inputs to many others, but it has a lot of indirect influence, in that the few sectors it does provide inputs are themselves high in outdegree centrality. Another example is Logging ("16) plus Pulp Mills ("104) providing the raw material to Paper ("105) & Paperboard Mills ("106). Other sectors in Q1 include Carbon Black ("124) and Printing Ink Manufacturing ("140). Carbon Black is mainly an ingredient to Tire Manufacturing ("150), thus it shows as being structurally less important. Similarly, Printing Ink Manufacturing mainly supplies its product to Printing ("113).
The bottom right quadrant (Q3) is home to sectors which are structurally important, irrespective of their contributions to GDP. Given that ''structure'' is usually not measured in economic analysis, the importance of sectors in Q3 may typically be overlooked. Located here is the bottom half of a cluster containing a large number of very diverse chemical products, with high levels of vulnerability to price increases: Organic ("126) and Inorganic Chemicals ("125); Alkalies & Chlorine ("123); and Synthetic Rubber ("128) . Most of these sectors use inputs from the Petrochemical Industry ("120), which is located in quadrant 4.
Covering the far right of both Q3 and Q4, we have the transport services cluster including trucking ("325) and flying ("322). As mentioned above, bankruptcies in the German shipping sector (the US equivalent being sector "324) are interesting with this respect. Among the many other problems this industry is facing globally i.e. reduced demand due to the global recession, overinvestment and indebtedness, liquidity crises, etc., are rising fuel prices. Even though sectorial vulnerability is notably smaller (2% expected price increase) than for example the also troubled (e.g. The Associated Press, 2013) airline industry (10.7%), shipping companies are unable to pass on these costs to their customers because of the considerable competition in that sector and an already slim profit margin being eaten up by rising oil prices (Evans-Pritchard, 2012) . This crisis was showing ripple effects in other industries, such as the German banking sector (Ewing, 2012) .
To the left of chemicals & plastics, almost in the center of the graph, we can detect two clusters covering the same area: one being construction materials and the other textiles or fibers. Therein we find on the one hand, for example, the highly vulnerable sectors of Cement ("160), Lime & Gypsum ("164), Reconstituted Wood ("98), Bricks ("154), Mineral Wool ("168), Flat Glass ("156) and Sand, Gravel, Clay, and Ceramic and Refractory minerals Mining and Quarrying ("26) . On the other hand we have Synthetic Fibers ("129) and Fabric, Textile, Fiber, Yarn, Thread and Fabric Coating Mills ("s 75, 78, 80, 81) , with notable price increases.
Finally, the top right quadrant (Q4) holds the most important sectors according to both monetary value and structural importance. We argue that vulnerable sectors in this quadrant, i.e. large bubbles, should be the main areas of concern from a policy perspective. Because such sectors contribute substantially to US GDP, and because they connect to so many other sectors, they could put the entire economy at risk in the case of Peak Oil or other supply interruptions. The present economic system relies strongly on them and their output may become significantly more expensive due to oil price increases. Clusters which are touching the area of Q4 are those of metals, e.g., Alumina ("172) and Iron Mills ("170), chemicals & plastics, e.g., Fertilizers "130, Petrochemicals "120, Plastics Material & Resin ("127) and Polystyrene ("146), and transport e.g. by Pipeline "327. However, most plastics sectors are located in Q3 indicating their structural importance. This makes intuitively sense given that plastics are in most products but their share of production costs is relatively low.
Discussion and conclusion
The above analysis could be seen as a health check for economies facing resource shortages or voluntary plans for reducing resource consumption. Moreover, it allows drawing conclusions about how to preemptively counteract possible economic crises, as a first step for developing adaptive resource management strategies. With this respect, our Peak Oil vulnerability map of the US economy implies two possible routes for adaptive policy action. The first would involve policy initiatives to essentially move highly vulnerable sectors away from Q4 (being structural and monetary important) toward Q1 (not important). Examples may include curbing the strong dependence on artificial fertilizers by promoting organic farming techniques, or reducing the overall distance traveled by people and goods by fostering local, decentralized economies.
The second route would involve trying to find substitutes from other sectors, in order to replace the output of vulnerable ones. Sometimes substitution may be difficult however, especially if close substitutes are also located in a similar position and show similar or worse vulnerability. Peak Oil is only one example for the fact that our society is reaching limits in the possible global production flows of many natural resources: Peak-Coal (Hughes, 2008; Kerr, 2009; Zittel and Schindler, 2007) , Peak-Phosphorus (Cordell et al., 2009; Dé ry and Anderson, 2007) , Peak-Uranium (Dittmar, 2012 (Dittmar, , 2011 , Peak-Minerals (Bardi and Pagani, 2007; Mason et al., 2011; Prior et al., 2012) ,. . ., Peak-Everything (Heinberg, 2007) . Most resource peaks are interlinked of course. Scheidel and Sorman (2012) , for example, show how Peak Oil might be linked to the global rush for arable land (land grabbing).
Replacing Plastic Packaging ("142), where applicable, with Paper ("108) or Paperboard ("107) packaging would be an example of such substitution difficulties. Both are situated in Q3 (i.e. are structurally important), and rank also relatively high in monetary importance. Another substitute for plastic packagingGlass Containers ("158) -does not have the same importance as paper and paperboard at the moment, but also shows high vulnerability. This means that moving from plastic to glass containers would shift the glass container sector toward the top right of the graph. Alumina Refining ("172) and Alloy Processing ("174), the source for another possible substitute for plastic packaging is also a quite vulnerable sector of Q4.
A substitution of Q4 sector outputs, based on products from existing industries, is likely to encounter two problems: First, the increased demand will inevitably shift the substituting sector toward the top right of the graph, running into the same difficulties as the sector that is being replaced; and second, if the substituting industry is mature, i.e. most scale effects and cost saving possibilities have already been realized, increasing demand will result in price increases in that sector also.
In other words, adapting our economies for the Peak Oil challenge is necessary, but not an easy task. However, tools like the one we have presented here represent the first step toward enhancing our knowledge about our economic system with respect to its dependency on oil. In addition our approach offers considerable potential for extensions, such as mapping developments over time or conducting comparative national studies. As outlined above these efforts could help policy makers in designing a roadmap toward a post-carbon economy.
